



The Potsdam Center for Transatlantic  
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Recommendations for a  
New Transatlantic Charta

A Strong Europe – A Partner,  
Not a Rival to the United States

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# RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A NEW TRANSATLANTIC CHARTA

## A STRONG EUROPE – A PARTNER, NOT A RIVAL TO THE UNITED STATES

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# **Recommendations for a New Transatlantic Charta**

## **A Strong Europe – A Partner, Not a Rival to the United States**

### **Introduction**

The transatlantic relationship is in a serious crisis after the Iraq war. The mood prevailing in Washington these days was elegantly expressed by the US-National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice: “Punish the French, ignore the Germans, forgive the Russians.” That alone will not heal the wounds which we inflicted upon each other. From the European perspective two main aspects need to be addressed: First and foremost, Europe must match its own standards with reality of the strategic environment of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century and speak with one voice on the international stage. This one voice must be backed by credible capabilities. However, we must recognize that a New World order in the 21<sup>st</sup> century can only be achieved if the 19<sup>th</sup> century pattern of power politics – recently in fashion again – cease to guide our thinking.

Accepting these premises, Europe can become both a global player and equal partner to the United States. Only then can a EU-US Strategic Dialogue take place across the Atlantic that enables both sides to heal the rift and jointly address the global security and non-security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

“To make the world safe for democracy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century” the United States will – despite all its military might – need a strong democratic partner. The Bush administration, with its emphasis on global security will recognize the attractions of a new contract with Europe if the European Union can live up to its own ambitions of becoming a full fledged international partner. Such partnership would amount to a “New Transatlantic Charta” in which Americans renew their commitment to remain a European power and Europe pledges to assume its responsibilities in maintaining the European-Atlantic space as a sphere of stability, democracy and progress.

Clearly, we need each other. But forging a new bond will require political lucidity and willpower on both sides of the Atlantic, especially in Europe. At the same time, a crisis always opens also windows of opportunity: An enlarged New Europe, with a new spirit, dynamism and good will is evolving. Transatlantic values never disappeared and we should not let a mass-murder like Saddam Hussein bury the values in the Arabic desert that did bind Europe and the United States since the

French and the American Revolution and the American Constitution. It's time to stop contemplating a split between the United States and Europe – this is not an option.

Appreciating the 1990 “Transatlantic Declaration” and the 1995 “New Transatlantic Agenda” this paper proposes the following recommendations for a “New Transatlantic Charta”, that should be further developed and lead up to a Report in a framework of perhaps six months under the auspices of a senior European and a senior American politician.

## **I. The Situation**

It is a triumph for democracy and freedom: American and British troops have toppled the monstrous regime of Saddam Hussein. Thanks to the resolve of George W. Bush and Tony Blair one of the most dangerous regimes of our times has been disarmed within 20 days - after 17 UN resolutions in 12 years have failed to achieve this goal peacefully. Every victim is one too much, every war is cruel. But in contrast to doomsayers' predictions it did not take months-long bombing nor has there been a spread of violence throughout the entire region. We did not see a new wave of terror attacks, nor bloodshed in the streets of Baghdad and the number of civilian and military casualties was relatively modest when compared to the hundred thousands of victims that died under Saddam's terror-regime. The allied victory can be regarded as a new start for peace and stability in the Greater Middle East.

The War in Iraq is the moment of truth for a new world-order, for the community of states' future security-architecture in the 21 century. It is the moment of truth for the EU, which has to decide whether it wants to define itself as a partner in an Atlanticist Europe or as counterpart in a Franco-German dominated Europe. It is also the moment of truth for the Atlantic Alliance, whose future depends on a twofold strategy: it must be able to respond militarily to global security threats and it must be allowed politically to do so.

The toppling of Saddam means the victory of a battle in a war totalitarian islamistic terrorists declared to the United States and Western Civilization on 11 September 2001. On that day, Al-Quada started its attempt to force on America and the rest of Western democracies what Samuel Huntington predicted as the "clash of civilizations": fanatic Islamism vs. Western "way of life" and Christianity. Washington's answer was a sensibly forged "alliance against terror", that was backed not only by NATO and the EU, but also by Russia, China, India and the most important Arabic states; and on a smaller scale even by Syria and Iran. Together the coalition launched a military intervention in Afghanistan to end the Taliban's reign of terror.

The disempowerment of the Arabic dictator Saddam Hussein – a ruler, whose totalitarian regime produced weapons of mass destruction, which he would have

used - had he been given the chance - unhesitatingly against other countries and would have made them available to terrorists of muslim or other origin, a ruler who rewarded families of Palestinian suicide bombers with money after they have killed dozens of Israelis - was the imperative of the hour to end the war of islamistic blindness against the West.

It is the moment of truth to see that the arrogance of power that the US are blamed for since 1945, is based on a *Realpolitik*, that for 50 years of Cold War has guaranteed a Free Europe, a free Germany and a divided Berlin political solidarity and military protection. After the Berlin wall - and with it communism - came down in 1989 and the predictable bi-polar order became an unpredictable multipolar (un-) order, George Bush sen. already called for a "New World Order" to fill the security vacuum left by the Cold War.

However, in the 90's the old continent was too preoccupied with pocketing its peace-dividend. Only Milosevic had roused Europe of its perpetual peace-dreams, but after the US had restored peace in Europe's backyard, the Balkans, - we remember: without an UN mandate – Brussels and Berlin went back to sleep.

Thanks to the American arrogance of power, Germany is reunified today after Washington worked hard to overcome resistance in Paris, London and Moscow in the 2+4 process. Thanks to Berlin's ideological arrogance of ignorance Europe is facing a crisis today. What the Soviets did not manage in 50 years - to isolate Germany in the transatlantic context, to split Europe and to paralyse NATO – Saddam Hussein achieved thanks to the Berlin Red-Green Government within just a few months: Europe will only recover if Berlin gives up its ill-fated "German Way" and finally takes up its full responsibility in foreign and security matters - 13 years after German Unification – that it owes to itself, Europe and the transatlantic partnership.

The Iraq-war was the moment of truth for Berlin's unprofessional, undiplomatic, anti-American and anti-European foreign and security policy. For the first time since 1945, Germany has a) severely damaged its relationship with the United States and b) reduced that to France to a common anti-American position. As a result of these policies, which are contrary to German, European and Atlantic interests, c) the

balance between Europe and America began to waver seriously. Moreover, Berlin has d) weakened the Alliance through its political refusal to support NATO's defense capabilities. Finally, e) Germany reduced the European influence in the UN to a minimum through its destructive and non-cooperative behaviour– although it had all diplomatic means through its chairmanship and the representation of 5(!) European states in the UN-Security Council, to foster a common European position by means of constructive engagement.

Europe missed the opportunity of the geostrategic tectonic shift between the falling of the Berlin wall and the falling of the World Trade Centre Towers to build up a coherent Common European Foreign- and Security Policy, not to speak about a serious military component. In the 1990's the old continent had - for the first time after 1945 - the power, the means and the freedom to bundle its capacities to "make Europe safe" for an equal partnership with the superpower United States and to become a global player, to be able to compete in the global markets of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Meanwhile the US has hastened away conceptually, strategically and economically and became a hyper-power.

Even after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Europe did not really wake up . President George Bush jun. reacted –as any other American president would have – fast to the potential link of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, and took the initiative. Washington did not feel constrained by an International Law that was created in the 17. century and does not tell us how to react to attacks of none-state terror-players, therefore has become obsolete and needs to be reformed and adjusted to the new strategic realities of the 21<sup>st</sup> century: The American administration as the British government – by the way two of the oldest democracies in the world – regarded the military intervention on Iraq as a pre-emptive step towards the need for a long term self-defense of the Community of free states. In this context, they did not feel dependent on a UN's approval, where a moral authority like Libya chairs the committee of human rights. Also George Bush jun., who is well-versed on the holy Bible, could easily do without the Catholic Church's moral comfort for he knows about its fallibility in the past centuries.

However, the American president would have happily counted on the support of two European states, that America has defended for decades during the cold war: Germany and France. Instead of standing close to its American ally – then the letters of the 8 EU-states and the Vilnius Group would have never been written – Jacques Chirac started to run an unprecedented campaign against Washington, taking Germany atop its shoulders. The “Grande Nation’s” president, who is probably the only head of state in the world still believing in France’s Great Power status fell victim to the Gaullistic delusion, which primary foreign policy objective was and is to contain American hegemony. To Paris, its interests in the Arabic deserts seemed to be more important than the transatlantic partnership. Against the background of the Iraq-war, Chirac seized the opportunity and hatched out an international coalition against Washington. Only a accomplice was missing since nearly all European partners stood by America on principle – and Germany was known for keeping the balance between Paris and Washington since the Elysee-Treaty 1963 so it would hardly turn against its most important ally.

Chancellor Schröder however carried out the most disastrous u-turn in German foreign-policy since 1945: Through his premature, public and one-sided commitment not to vote for a US-led resolution against Iraq in the UN Security Council – known now as the “German way” – the Chancellor snubbed the American President and drove a wedge into the transatlantic Alliance, the European Union and the UN.

From the new national foreign policy of the weakest German post-war Chancellor only Jacques Chirac benefited. Not without overestimation of his own abilities, the French President used the European vacuum to position himself together with Germany against Washington and London. Suddenly, there is talk again in the 21. century about “Gaullistic counterbalance” and the “Concert of Powers”. Right and left of the Seine, the French began singing of global balance-policies against the hyperpower America. And from Goslar to Giessen, they chanted “Ami go home!” Not the elimination of one of the most brutal regimes in recent history was Berlin’s or Paris’ ambition; both rather wanted to keep a tight rein on the US and prevent a unipolar world-order.

The German chancellors' anti-American overtones are based not only on his biography – already as Minister-President of Lower Saxony, he felt closer to Castro's Cuba than to Clinton's America. They must be considered as well-thought out strategy of the Red-Green leadership, which was supposed to help distract from the catastrophic results of its domestic agenda by appealing to the peace-movement of the German Left - which in the worst case can mean the end of democracy and freedom - and mobilizing latently existing anti-American resentments on the Right and on the Left.

These anti-American resentments can be discovered already in Fichte's writings and his morally-motivated sense of cultural superiority. And they still form the intellectual basis of many right-wing intellectuals in Germany. The left-wingers in comparison, who are driven by self-hatred for their own country, have never gotten over the fact that it were Americans who freed Auschwitz – the same Americans that became guilty in Vietnam – and admitted it - and the same Americans that stocked Germany with nuclear missiles instead of peace-doves in times of the Cold War - and history proofed them right again. But also parts of the German Right have problems dealing with the 8 May 1945: they cannot accept that date as one of liberation but define it as one of defeat. Finally Germany was not liberated by the *Wehrmacht*, but by American-GI's – possibly including black soldiers. It was common *raison d'être* of all German chancellors from Adenauer via Brandt to Kohl to counterbalance those resentments- and not to stir them up as Gerhard Schröder as the first post war German Chancellor did.

As to French Anti-Americanism, it has its roots both in the French and American Revolution. The French Revolution had a rather nationalistic character, the American had more a universalistic vision. The fact that France would have lost World War I without the United States contributes to France's inferiority complex to the same extent as the fact that it was America which tolerated France as victorious power *honoris causa* after 1945 – despite Vichy.

Today, the Franco-German relations rest on the thin ice of a mutual disapproval of the leading power USA – that determines the hypocrisy of their relationship. Berlin and Paris formed an alliance with the hardly liberal Moscow and the hardly

democratic Beijing in order to contain the oldest democracy of the modern age, the United States. But at the end of the day, both for Moscow and Beijing, their relationship to Washington will be more important than to the former middle-power and Central-European paper tiger. Washington's displeasure with countries and institutions tactlessly trying to paralyse America politically and denouncing it morally – whose media openly showed *Schadenfreude* when not the enemy Saddam Hussein but the allied forces were falling in Iraqi traps - should not be underestimated.

Now the moment of truth has also come for the *realpolitisch* non-existing Franco-German axis: both countries have to decide now, whether they are interested in a Common European Foreign- and Security Policy side by side with the US or whether they accept the split of the continent and the paralyzation the transatlantic partnership – in a new era where it is necessary to stand together against new global threats.

The current crisis will show, if the New Europe under the leadership of the Briton Blair, the Spaniard Aznar and the Pole Kwasniewski will assert itself – a strong , dynamic and equal Europe which together with the United States has taken the necessary security policy action as a result of the changing paradigms in world history since 1989 and 2001 and that contributes in shaping a New World Order. Or if the arrogance and ignorance of the Old Europe will continue splitting the transatlantic Alliance like Germany and France did in an unprecedented manner. For one thing we should be clear: Only Schröder's "German Way", which led Germany's foreign policy to irrelevance and Europe into a dangerous vacuum, allowed Jacques Chirac to develop his hubris for a French world policy and to threat with a veto in the UN-Security Council against the US. Not even those African states that are financially dependent on Paris wanted to follow and risk a confrontation with Washington.

Britons, Spaniards, Italians, Portuguese, Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, the Baltic states, but also Romanians or Bulgarians, they all can imagine the future of Europe only side by side with America. That became obvious again during the historic EU-Summit in Athens on 16 April. . Europe's interests are Atlantic interests too, a unified and strong Europe is the best ally for the US, and Washington knows that, too.

Therefore the Summit of the “Four NATO –Unfit” France, Germany, Belgium and Luxemburg of this week and their suggestion to form a European Army and an EU-Headquarter for Military Planning must appear to the member-states of the New Europe as a bad joke and to Washington as an ongoing provocation by the Old Europe. So was the previous Summit of the “Three losers in St. Petersburg” Chirac-Putin-Schröder the wrong signal at the wrong time: Unholy alliances like these belong into the 19<sup>th</sup> Century. Europe can only be taken seriously as a partner of the United States if at least London, Berlin and Paris start to agree with each other again.

Also for NATO the moment of truth is getting closer these days. It needs clear commitments on both sides of the Atlantic, if it does not want to become an armed OSCE. At the same time, the Alliance has a great opportunity: there is no instrument as suitable as NATO with its range and its capacities to provide and guarantee peace, order and stability in post-war Iraq.

For a lasting peace in the Broader Middle-East Washington needs Europe because it can neither be achieved through an American military protectorate nor through the hope of a wondrous blossoming of the plant democracy in the desert sand. It needs a long-term strategy to build up democracy, that the Europeans have to help create with their historic experiences and their approaches in civil society. States already on their way to democracy like Turkey, Morocco, Egypt or Jordan could partly serve as model. To deny the Arab world the ability to become democratic – as some “Middle East Experts” do – simply shows Western arrogance and ignorance.

Finally, the UN’s decision-making structures and current International Law need to be reformed and become adapted to the reality of a post-post-war world and order. Otherwise both institutions run the risk of losing their world-political relevance.

A first step towards a common action - that should be shared by UN and safeguarded by NATO – would be an American-European initiative to “make the Greater Middle East safe for democracy”. Marshall-Plans against the “Talibanization” of the Greater Middle East are necessary in order to dry out the soil for the recruiting of Islamic terror. In this context, fighting against analphabetism and youth unemployment are

the most important steps to be taken when politically restructuring Iraq but also other states in the region.

At stake is a New World Order, that George Bush sen. had already called for: George Bush jun. will be judged by the success with which he manages to design and defend a New World Order – together with Europe, NATO, the UN and perhaps with Russia and China as well.

## **II. Recommendations for the Future of the Transatlantic Relationship**

### ***An Agenda for the New Europe as a Global Player and Partner of the United States***

Europe has a success story to tell. The launch of the European Monetary Union in 1999 and the introduction of the Euro laid the foundation for future competitiveness for Europe's economy and prosperity for its citizens. By the same token, the introduction of the Euro laid the political and economic fundamentals for the European Union to become a global player and an economic powerhouse.

The Euro, after a weak start against the dollar, is gradually evolving into a respected world currency. Internally, a strong Euro will put the necessary pressure on the countries to follow through with overdue reforms. It is the Euro and the Stability Pact that impose fiscal discipline on member states. The Euro is much more than just a currency. It is a symbol of European Integration, one of the most significant political and economic accomplishments of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century.

The new, enlarged Europe has the potential to become a major force in world affairs as a partner to the United States. To achieve this, all European states must pursue a common strategy. The prerequisite for this is the definition of our interests, answering the questions, "What world we want to see twenty-five or fifty years from now? What should be Europe's political, economic and military contributions to achieve such a world? And does it have the political will to invest in the necessary means and capabilities for that endeavour?"

With the enlarged New Europe bringing in new dynamism into the EU - with a fresh mind, fresh visions and new interests – it is now the time for the EU to become what it has failed to become after 1990: a global player and responsible strong partner. The following issues must be addressed in order for Europe to take up a responsible role in world affairs.

## **1. Completion of EU Enlargement**

When ten countries - Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Malta, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia - signed the EU accession treaties on 16 April 2003, they decided to join what George Papandreou called the “largest, most fascinating peace project in the world and possibly in mankind's history.”

The new EU members signed a contract to become part of the most innovative economic and political project of the last fifty years. Too often, we tend to take what has been achieved in this regard for granted, discussing this process in terms of the problems ahead rather than in terms of the enormous achievements done.

The signing of the Treaty of Accession in Athens should be seen as a new beginning, a new chance for Europe to complete what the EU's founders had envisaged for the organization: to foster peace and stability in Europe and beyond.

### **The Challenges after EU enlargement 2004**

The EU and the current candidate countries have been debating the future of Europe, concentrating on how the EU will operate after the inclusion of 10 new members. But with few exceptions – the UK government as well as Chris Patten and Javier Solana – there has been little discussion of EU policy toward the *new* neighbors of the EU. These, of course, refer to the Eastern Europe/post communist countries that will *not* become members of the EU after the Grand Enlargement.

In 2004, the countries bordering the EU will include Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia and Croatia. Only a stone's throw beyond these new borders lie Moldova, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, Georgia and Armenia.

The new neighbours have different perspectives of entering the EU. While Croatia, Serbia, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro need to be pushed for stronger reforms and democratic stability in order to be given a perspective for EU-accession in the medium term, Romania and Bulgaria in particular should be held to a tight schedule. These are the countries most at risk in any slow-down of EU-enlargement. They need to follow closely the roadmap spelt out at the

Copenhagen Summit so that no excuses can be made to keep them out and so that their elites take a more radical approach to reform.

While Grand Enlargement has been successful in prompting and sustaining a revolutionary transformation of eight formerly communist countries, the picture is rather different for the rest of the post-communist world. Those states that failed to enact deep and wide-ranging reforms are plagued by metastasizing corruption; their societies inadvertently export organized crime, illegal immigrants and little else. The new neighbours, especially those with few prospects at this time for EU membership have advanced little since the collapse of communism.

The challenge is to prevent that border line from becoming an economic, social and political dividing line, constructed, bolstered and maintained by EU policies, resulting in what Toomas Hendrik Ilves has called a "Great Wall of Europe" (see his essay "The Grand Enlargement and the Great Wall of Europe").

If Europe is unwilling to entertain the idea of a Ukraine or a Belarus as EU members, then it is necessary to develop a new, alternative strategy and also make it clear that membership during the next quarter century is not possible.

The European Union could seriously consider other forms of relations with its new neighbours, a form of association less than membership but considerably more substantial than what is currently offered by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements or the even more substantial Association agreements. A new, expanded Association agreement would have to offer far more generous economic support, market access as well as access to various EU programs from e-Europe to Sapard and ISPA, but without an accession perspective. Such an approach would make it clear to the new neighbours that membership is possible in a distant future, but that until then, serious reforms are expected.

As for Turkey, the EU decided not to offer a concrete date for the beginning of accession talks at the Summit in Copenhagen in December 2002 and merely promised that if Turkey fulfilled the so-called Copenhagen criteria on human rights and democracy by December 2004 these talks could then begin "without further

delay." Going forward, the EU needs to encourage Turkey to pursue its reform process in order to enhance its chances to start accession negotiations by 2004.

Turkey knows that it only can become a member if it shows greater respect for human rights and a reduced role in government affairs for Turkey's military. Ankara must also demonstrate sustained economic growth to minimize the flood of Turkish emigration that many Europeans fear will result from its admission to the EU.

If Turkey fulfils all the requirements necessary, the fact that it is a muslim country should not be a counter-argument against accession. Quite contrary, the EU should apply a geostratgic perspective and see Turkey's immediate closeness to the Islamic world as a major advantage. With Turkey as a member, the EU would be much better positioned to establish sustainable relationships with the Greater Middle East.

Turkey's Foreign Minister Yasar Yakis is right in the long-term, when he claims, that the EU needs Turkey to become a truly global player influencing world affairs meaningfully. Turkey is stabilizing the Black Sea region, builds a counterweight to Russia, controls the passage between Black Sea and the Mediterranean and plays an important role on the Balkans. In addition, Europe's gas and oil imports are covered to 60% by countries that are neighbouring Turkey.

The US puts special emphasis on its geostrategic partnership with Turkey. Establishing serious cooperation with the conflict regions of the Broader Middle East and its Islamic culture is one of the prime goals of European foreign policy. Fostering the integration of this region will be much easier when Turkey will be admitted a key role of serving as a European-Muslim bridge, thereby contributing to the prevention of Samuel Huntingtons „Clash of Civilizations“ to expand into Europe.

## **2. Completion of the Constitution of the European Union – More Monnet, less Metternich**

The Presidency of the European Convention has just presented the first draft for the first 16 articles of the first Constitution of the European Union which can be expected to be completed soon. Greece, the origin of the oldest democracy in the world, is holding the EU presidency in this defining moment of the Union and might see the finalization of the European Constitution. Should it happen within Greece's term then the signing-ceremony of this epochal moment can only take place at the true cradle of democracy – the Acropolis.

A Constitution serves since centuries as a nucleus in which institutions of democratic decision-making processes are always laid down. And a federation of nations states is necessary, as Carl Bildt pointed out in his lecture "Is Europe Ready for the Future?" at Humboldt University, "since this is the way in which we can ensure that the powers of the regions and of the nations are preserved and protected, thus furthering the diversity in cultures, traditions and experiences that gives Europe a richness others can only envy". This process today is a unique moment in history – a Union of independent national states voluntarily commit themselves in writing to further unity, a unity that might one day become a truly supranational European power.

The EU should strive for "more Monnet and less Metternich" (to quote Elmar Brok), for more European Integration and less nationalistic behaviour, because single national states are ill equipped to meet the new challenges and threats of globalization.

With regard to foreign policy, the Iraq crisis has shown that Europe is still characterized by national interests. The rules laid down more than 10 years ago on a Common Foreign and Security Policy in the Treaty of Maastricht are often openly infringed or ignored. Europe does not speak with one voice in the world – because there is no common voice.

The creation of the European Convention lends a tremendous opportunity to make a decisive step forward towards a united foreign policy of the European Union that deserves this name.

The draft articles on external action in the Constitutional Treaty of 23 April 2003 already demand that the members of the European Union need to define the common interest in all foreign and security policy matters and develop an institutional process for streamlined consultation and decision making. In particular, a European Minister for Foreign Affairs is suggested, who speaks and represents the entire EU when it comes to foreign affairs.

Also, Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) is suggested. Here, it should be added that QMV would apply in all matters of foreign and security policy with the exception of subjects with military implications, where Member States that are willing to cooperate more closely may do – on the clear premise to do so without excluding other members.

The draft for the European Constitution also suggests, that the diplomatic missions of the Member States and the delegations of the Union shall cooperate in third countries and in international organizations. To enhance the efficiency of European Foreign and Security Policy, the pooling of diplomatic staff could be furthered and most national representations could be easily transformed into “EU Embassies” staffed by EU representatives and diplomats from the member countries.

As for a future President of the European Union, the President of the European Convention, Valerie Giscard d’Estaing, has recently proposed that the European Council shall elect its President for two and a half years, following the suggestion of the larger member countries like France and Germany, provoking immediately resistance from both the EU Commission and from smaller member countries. The fear is that EU policy will be stronger dominated by the national interests of the larger countries and pursue a less integrative approach.

While Giscard’s suggestion will allow for a better coordination of the Council’s decision-making process by ending the 6-month rotating presidency and might be implemented into the Constitution, it does not address the problem of double structures between Council and Commission.

The position of Javier Solana, the High Representative, and the one of the Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten, will rightly be brought together in order to create greater coherence of EU action and clarity in EU representation as the EU has drawn lessons from the problem of over-representation in the field of Foreign and Security Policy. One has to ask, then, if a “double hat” would not make sense on the presidential level as well.

The European Union might consider to elect *one*, not *two* Presidents in order to overcome the inefficiencies in its decision-making process. As a suggestion, the leaders of the European Union should consider to combine the functions of the President of the Commission and the President of the European Council. The President of the Commission should also act as a Chairman of the European Council and coordinate and lead its meetings, without having a voting right.

Such a model would bring the same advantages as a permanent President of the Council: The decision-making process could be streamlined here as well since the 6-month rotating presidency would end in this case, too, and with it the accompanying nationally-driven priority settings, thus creating stronger cohesion and continuity in EU’s policies.

Another added value of such a solution would be that the President of the Council already has its own secretariat and staffers that would be capable of coordinating the policy making process of the Council without having to create an extra administration. In contrast, a separate permanent President/Chairman would need to build up this capacity first leading to the creation of another bureaucratic body within the EU.

The future President of the European Union, who would need to be approved by the European Parliament, could act as neutral voice and mediator in conflict situations within the Council. And with the inauguration of a President of “United States of Europe” the EU will be closer to equal partnership with the United States of America as well as also closer to Jean Monnet’s vision.

### **3. Establishing of an EU Seat at the UN Security Council and Reform of International Law**

As a result of a stronger European approach in the conduct of Foreign and Security Policy, the EU should find it easier to commit its member states to first find a common position and to forestall in the future a multivoiced nationally driven diplomacy as it happened during the Iraq crisis at the United Nations and where the disagreements in the Security-Council not only reflected bad on Europe's unity but also on the need to reform UN decision-making structures and current International Law. If no adaptation to the realities of a post 9/11 world order takes place, both institutions otherwise run the risk to lose their world-political relevance.

#### **EU-Seat at the UN Security Council**

A common European position would need a qualified majority of the EU members as well and allow members to abstain if they cannot be convinced to follow the EU wide position. Such an agreement could serve as a prerequisite for a new initiative to establish an EU Seat at the UN Security Council and to speak with one voice to the world community. However, given that the reform of the UN Security Council has been postponed for years now, the EU should make use of the seats of Great Britain and France. Both countries are understandably not willing to permanently give up their seats. They could however, forego their seat every other year to the benefit of the EU. For example, in 2005 Great Britain would offer its seat to the EU; in 2006 Great Britain regain its seat and France steps back in favour of the EU.

Such a bold step would demonstrate urgently-needed European leadership and set examples. As a permanent member, the European Union could push for the urgently required UN reforms.

## Reform of International Law

9/11 as well as the Iraq crisis made current International Law obsolete, which means that it needs to be changed substantially.

The UN were once again unable to see their own decisions through when they failed to do what UNSCR 1441 had threatened as the consequence of non-compliance. As a result no one should expect that an American administration will turn to the UN again as long as the US believes to be at war. This, however, is the view in Washington since 9/11. But the issues at stake go beyond the UN, they aim at some of the fundamentals of International Law. One question raised by this crisis is whether an international order which treats democracies as equals of tyrannies and which therefore offers the same degree of protection against intervention to both of them is the order of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Another issue to be debated is whether the extant definition of self-defense is good enough in a world in which WMD are spreading. There are no answers at this time but to cling to an order which was born in the 17<sup>th</sup> century and then heavily influenced by the outcome of WW II and the defeat of colonialism is definitely no answer as well.

For sure after the Iraq crisis the attempt to impose binding International Law on the use of force has failed and the structure and rules of the UN Security Council reflect the hopes of its founders rather than the realities of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Article 51 of the charter permits the use of force only in self-defense, and only "if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations."

9/11 made clear that this rule alone is not sufficient anymore to rule the international system since it is based on the assumption of attacks from states – not from non-state actors like totalitarian terror groups, which cannot be classically deterred.

The US, after the crushing of the World Trade Center, concluded that under certain circumstances it must be allowed to defend itself before an "armed attack" occurs. Or, as the American National Security Strategy 2002 put it, Americans "cannot let our enemies strike first." Therefore, "to forestall or prevent ... hostile acts by our adversaries the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively".

Key in this regard is the definition of when an attack would be of “immediate imminence”. As Joseph Nye argues, generally, pre-emptive strikes would need to be backed up multilaterally and suggests to lay out the conditions when such a strike would be legitimized in Article 7 of the UN Charter, which defines cases of threat to peace.

The difficulty is that such definition of conditions need to be an ongoing process since it will be difficult to anticipate future challenges and then strive to regulate in advance, before problems, which we do not know yet, develop.

In times of major uncertainty and earthmoving shifts in the international political system it makes more sense to continuously develop International Law.

The legitimacy of pre-emptive strikes is debatable, but before portraying the United States as warmongering rambos, one needs to consider that the American President – George W. Bush or any other president – feels first and foremost committed to defend the American people. The US administration considered the danger coming from the combination of a mass-murder and dictator who has produced and used WMD, and from terrorist groups with ambitions to acquire such WMD, a grave enough danger to legitimize self-defense, because it feared that the price for waiting – perhaps another thousands of Americans killed – would have been too high.

Those who blame a newly US unilateralism for being the root cause of the undermining of International Law, should consider the following sentence: "We have to keep defending our vital interests just as before; we can say no, alone, to anything that may be unacceptable." It may come as a surprise that those were not the words of administration hawks such as Paul Wolfowitz or Donald Rumsfeld. In fact, they were written in 2001 by Hubert Vedrine, then France's foreign minister. Similarly, critics of American "hyperpower" might guess that the statement, "I do not feel obliged to other governments," must surely have been uttered by an American. It was in fact made by German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder on 10 February 2003. The first and lasting geopolitical truth is that states pursue security by pursuing power. After all, would China, France, or Russia -- or any other country -- voluntarily abandon preeminent power if it found itself in the position of the United States?

The greater danger after the second Iraq War is not that the United States will use force when it should not, but that, chastened by the war's horror, the public's opposition, and the economy's gyrations, it might not use force when it should.

With all the unpredictable disorder and elements of anarchy in the world, Europe and the United States cannot afford to be at the brink of divorce over such overarching topics like International Law.

There are no two societies so close to each other sharing the same history, values and culture. The West has to take the initiative for reform of International Law. A joint commission of American and European Legal experts should be asked to make suggestions to be presented at the United Nations and to be discussed in the UN General Assembly.

#### **4. Creation of a Transatlantic Free Trade Area - TAFTA**

Economically, Europe and the United States are the two most closely bound regions in the world. Globalization is happening faster and reaching deeper between Europe and the United States than between any other two continents. This high degree of transatlantic interdependence gives strong potential of future co-operation.

Europe and America could probably not find a better moment to turn the severe crisis in their relationship into a promising economic success story. What is needed now is a re-launch of TAFTA, an idea that was brought forward for the first time in 1994: a Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Area.

The then Commission-Vice-President Sir Leon Brittan as well as former German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel were the strongest supporter of this idea, which found its first expression in the "New Transatlantic Agenda" (NTA), signed in December 1995 at the EU-US Summit in Madrid, and which commits the EU and the US to "progressively reducing or eliminating barriers that hinder the flow of goods, services and capital between us." Much of this work has since then been carried out within the "Transatlantic Business Dialogue" (TABD), pursuing a step by step approach of harmonizing regulations and standards. However, initiatives like the NTA or the "Transatlantic Economic Partnership" (TEP) have been of limited success and a new, more ambitious approach, a single comprehensive agreement, is needed.

The creation of a Transatlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA), linking the United States and the European Union together and establishing the world's largest free trade zone, would not only guarantee the free movement of goods, capital, services and persons but would also bring a new dynamism in both the transatlantic relations and global trade, a dynamism, that is so urgently needed in the transatlantic relationship.

Foreign Direct Investment--not trade--is the backbone of the transatlantic economy. Although transatlantic trade disputes steal the headlines, trade itself accounts for less than 20% of transatlantic commerce, and US-EU trade disputes account for less than 1% of transatlantic commerce.

The total output of U.S. foreign affiliates in Europe (\$333 billion in 2000) and of European affiliates in the U.S. (\$301 billion) is greater than the total gross domestic

output of most nations. In 2001, and throughout most of the 1990s, Europe accounted for half of total global earnings of U.S. companies, as measured by U.S. foreign affiliate income. Vice versa, the United States is the most important market in the world in terms of earnings for European multinationals. U.S. affiliate income of European companies rose more than fivefold in the 1990's to nearly \$26 billion.

Corporate America's foreign assets tallied over \$5.2 trillion in 2000. The bulk of these assets - roughly 58% - were located in Europe. America's asset base in the UK is almost equivalent to the combined overseas affiliate asset base of Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. U.S. assets in Germany alone -- \$300 billion in 2000 -- were greater than total U.S. assets in all of South America.

Europe's investment stake in the U.S., on an historical-cost basis, grew to a whopping \$835 billion in 2000, which is nearly one-quarter larger than America's stake in Europe. European firms have never been as exposed to the U.S. economy as in the first decade of the 21st century.

In addition, Europe profits strongly from the fact that two-thirds of U.S. corporate research and development conducted outside the United States is conducted in Europe.

In sum, the years since the fall of the Berlin wall have witnessed one of the greatest periods of transatlantic economic integration in history. Our mutual stake in each other's prosperity has grown dramatically since the end of the Cold war – and the importance of Europe for the American economy is greater than ever.

As an economic giant the EU is taken seriously by the US and seen as an equal partner. In contrast to international security issues, it is in this area that the EU can take the lead in developing the transatlantic relationship further – especially after Enlargement.

Given the data mentioned above, it seems logical that the two leaders of the world trading system could work together to resolve their remaining trade problems and in the process set powerful precedents for the rest of the world to follow. In so doing, they would accelerate progress toward the ultimate goal of global free trade.

Already, a large proportion of bilateral trade takes place free of any restrictions, but major exceptions remain, e.g. non-tariff trade barriers. To overcome this, a powerful new initiative such as TAFTA would be well suited.

The EU should set up a timetable for TAFTA's implementation. Since the majority of the US leadership recognizes that it benefits from fair and healthy relationships with the EU in trade questions, it should be possible to find support in Washington.

Ideas like TAFTA have been raised several times over the last years. Maybe they would have been discussed more sincerely had there been more frequent and stronger institutionalized discussions between European and American political and business leaders on how to improve EU-US relations in practical terms. Let's make TAFTA an economic transatlantic imperative, now, by developing – for example NAFTA and EMU into a new Transatlantic Free Trade Area.

## **5. Establishment of an “European Academy” for Scholars and Artists in Washington, DC**

Apart from efforts to strengthen transatlantic ties politically, economically and diplomatically, the intellectual exchange between the US and Europe needs to be enhanced in a time when many European scholars, writers and artists are at odds with the United States and its policies.

The creation of an institution in the United States that would allow both America-critical and America-appreciative artists and scholars to live and work for a year in the United States could help to overcome some stereotypes about America in the minds of opinion-multipliers and serve as intellectual bridges over the Atlantic.

The goal of a “European Academy” in Washington DC would be to foster the exchange of leading European intellectuals and their American counterparts as well as exposure to a broader audience in the US. Selected fellows from all EU member countries would be given an opportunity to stay and work a significant amount of time in the US, receiving a vibrant picture of the diversity and dynamism of American Political Thought, American way of life and culture and thereby fostering the appreciation of the wide and sophisticated spectrum of American society, science and arts. At the same time, the presence of the fellows would also help to ensure that many facets of European history, cultures and values are present in the US capital, as well.

For example, fellows could be scholars and artists engaged in history, philosophy, literary criticism, economics, public policy, painting or classical and modern music. The “European Academy” would provide a home and work environment for the fellows, giving them the opportunity to work on their individual projects. While in Washington, each fellow would engage in a significant scholarly or artistic project – be it a biography or novel, a philosophical analysis, a painting or the composition of a concerto.

While the residential environment would offer the fellows valuable opportunities for cross-disciplinary discussion, one of the main goals would be the exchange with Americans in Washington DC and elsewhere. Public lectures, seminars, debates and performances would typically involve the Fellows and the US capital’s cultural, political, academic and corporate communities. Also, the Academy would help

arrange affiliations for the fellows with universities, ministries, agencies, think tanks, museums, libraries or other professional organizations in Washington.

The fellows would receive a monthly stipend, room and board and other support for their work. Funding would need to come from both private and public sources, whereby 25 EU countries would share the endowment accomplished by significant fundraising efforts.

The amount of money needed will be a small price to pay when one considers the quality of exchange that would be enabled by the “European Academy” and the fact that the fellows become ambassadors from Washington and the US when they return to Europe, thus deepening and broadening the transatlantic ties. The Academy would also be symbol to remind America that it is also a European power and that Americans should never forget their roots.

## **6. Make a Common European Foreign and Security Policy a Strategic Reality**

To be a strong partner and a serious player in the transatlantic security partnership with the United States as well strategically relevant in a new global security environment, the European Union not only need to speak with one voice, but also to fulfil its pledges to build up military capabilities, strengthen its intervention and crisis management capabilities and commit its forces to more power projection in order to meet the security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century: fundamentalism, ethnic strife, the spread of WMD, and new and old forms of terrorism.

After the embarrassing performance of EU troops in the management of the Balkan crisis and in particular in Kosovo, the EU initiated the European Security and Defense Policy at the Helsinki Summit in 1999. EU member states committed themselves to the Headline Goals. It was agreed to be able to deploy by 2003 forces up to 60.000 personnel capable of the full range of the Petersburg tasks.

These forces should be militarily self-sustaining, with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat-support services and air and naval elements. Member states should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and to provide smaller rapid-response elements more quickly than this. They must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year.

The reality looks darker: Even after 9/11 and the Iraq crisis the sum of the capabilities committed to the Headline Goal will probably not be met by late 2003. This means that the EU's first serious attempt to reduce the growing capability gap towards the United States has failed.

The gap between words and deeds with regard to ESDP, led Washington repeatedly to ask Europeans either to underpin their new strategic claims both financially and militarily or just forget about it. Unless specific and binding convergence-criteria and fiscal discipline similar to those imposed on the European Monetary Union are put into effect, Europe will never be able to manage crises without heavy dependence on the United States.

Another key to the fulfillment of the EU Headline Goals will be the establishment of an “Agency for Armaments and Strategic Research” as suggested in the draft articles for the European Convention in order to encourage the improvement of military capability. Such an effort can build on experiences made in already existing defense cooperation forums such as the Organization for Joint Armaments Co-operation (OCCAR), whose participants Britain, France, Germany and Italy account for 80 per cent of EU spending on research, development and procurement already. The Netherlands, Spain and Belgium have applied to join and Sweden has expressed serious interest, which would bring most of the EU’s defense industry within the ambit of OCCAR.

There is also need for closer cooperation of defense industries across the Atlantic. The policy should not be to *buy American* or *buy European* but to *buy transatlantic*, procuring the most advanced systems at the lowest cost. Political will in Washington to share US technology with European Allies is a precondition for transatlantic defense-consolidation. There is only one way to gain influence on the United States and that is to acquire capabilities that really matter. Sectors where the United States could need the European contributions to sustain operations or be able to operate in more than one theatre include ground surveillance, air-to-air-refueling and air transport. European willingness to launch such a modernization program should be matched by increased American preparedness to share technology. Close industrial and military transatlantic cooperation can become a strategic component of both CSFP and ESDP – in particular after EU-enlargement.

To make a Common European Foreign and Security Policy a strategic reality, the EU could develop a coherent foreign policy strategy towards the major countries and regions in the world. Such thinking is unfamiliar to most European countries, with the exception of Great Britain and France.

Further, the EU should project an image of unity to the outside world. The European disunity during the Iraq crisis harmed European interests, damaged the relationship with the United States and paralysed NATO. All the more a reason to speak rather sooner than later with *one* voice and not with *two* voices to the outside world.

In most EU countries, geostrategic planning has been replaced by extensive multilateralism. This applies in particular for Germany. However, dialogues, multilateral discussion-groups and frameworks for cooperation with other countries will not position the EU as a strategic player on the world stage. For CSFP and ESDP to be acknowledged as a driving force in the world, the leaders of the European Union need to set clear priorities as to what kind of relationship they want to maintain with the most important countries and what the European Unions' interests in that relationship should be.

Of course, political dialogue is maintained with all key countries and regions of the world and the efforts have resulted in progress in both the development of the respective countries and the relationship towards the EU. However, the EU policies towards these countries are mainly based on trade and business dialogues and efforts to integrate these countries multilaterally. But who could name clear interests and goals the EU pursues in China or India – two of the largest countries in the world?

If the EU does not want to leave global strategic-alliance-making to the US, a precise strategy combined with a precise message to the outside world is imperative. A common EU approach on politically restructuring Iraq would be a beginning.

#### A Marshallplan for the Greater Middle East

A common set of driving forces across the region from Northern Africa to Pakistan is contributing to the toxic combination of radical anti-Western ideologies, terrorism, rogue states, failed states, and the drive to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

A first concrete step towards a common action - that should be shared by UN and safeguarded by NATO – would be an American-European initiative “to make the Greater Middle East safe for democracy”. A Marshall-Plan against the “Talibanization” of the Near and Middle East are necessary in order to dry out the soil for the recruiting of islamic terror.

In the medium term, such a strategy must aim to provide work, dignity, and livelihoods for the people of the region. The regional societies need to come to grips with modernity and create new civil societies that allow them to compete and

integrate in the modern world. Fighting against analphabetism and youth unemployment are the most important steps to be taken. The drivers for such process are democratization, free market economics, rule of law, and progressive education.

In this respect, the countries of Central- and Eastern Europe could provide special expertise, a fresh voice of a new Member of the European Union, former Polish Minister of Finance and former Deputy Prime Minister, Leszek Balcerowitz suggests: "Iraq's present condition is no more difficult than that of the Central European countries twelve years ago. Iraq has high inflation, variable rates of exchange (official versus unofficial), one dominant economic sector, rationing of foodstuffs, and a large percentage of young people. All of this is similar to what the first post-communist Polish government inherited in 1989. Central European and Baltic countries could share these experiences with the Iraqis, especially with regard to the privatization of small and medium-sized enterprises".

## ***An Agenda for NATO to remain Politically and Militarily Relevant***

After the end of the cold war NATO did not fall apart, but rather adapted to new requirements. NATO has a success-story to tell. NATO opening happened twice: In March 1999 the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined the Alliance at the Washington Summit. And now we were witnessing the second NATO-enlargement with the recent accession of seven new member states. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia were invited last November in Prague to become members of NATO. The Alliance has achieved a historical triumph: Europe united in peace, democracy and common values from the Baltics to the Balkans, from the Atlantic to the Black Sea.

From the beginning, the purpose of NATO enlargement was, as Ron Asmus points out in his new book "Opening NATO's Door", to help lock in a new peace order in Europe following communism's collapse and the end of the Cold War. The goal was to promote a process of pan-European integration and reconciliation that would make the prospect of armed conflict as inconceivable in the Eastern half of the continent as it had become in the Western half.

From an American perspective, the imperative was to ensure that America never again had to fight another major war in Europe. The US used the window that had opened after 1990 to lock in a durable peace in Europe. Most importantly, the Americans wanted to be able to face future security threats elsewhere in the world knowing that security in Europe was assured.

The purpose of NATO enlargement was and is to strengthen Europe's security within its own borders and no longer worry about conflict with Russia or ethnic strife in their backyard. At the same time, NATO gained new Allies who joined the West in addressing the new threats of the post-Cold War era. "The new Allies from Central and Eastern Europe, having fought hard to regain their freedom and independence", stresses the former Deputy Defense Minister of Hungary, István Gyarmati, "bring also fresh blood, ideas and enthusiasm to NATO".

But NATO went also through troubled waters: After the fall of the Berlin wall, already in July 1990, at their meeting in London, NATO's Heads of State and Government recognized in the "Strategic Concept" that risks to Allied security would be less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from "adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties". The war in Kosovo was a bitter example which proved NATO right.

Also NATO's new "Strategic Concept" of April 1999 explicitly reflects the fact that "Alliance security interests can be affected by risks of a wider nature, including act of terrorism, sabotage and organized crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources". It took only two years to prove the relevance of this farsighted mission statement. The ruthless attack by totalitarian Islamic terrorists on the United States of America on the 11<sup>th</sup> of September 2001 reminded us of the enduring requirement for transatlantic cooperation and made it clear that the new strategic challenges are global in nature and need a collective response. Only in a common effort, institutionalized in NATO, Europeans and Americans will be able to meet the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In decades of cold war and dangerous political as well as military confrontation it was never necessary to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. But in September 2001 NATO was able to show that the key to peace and security is decisiveness and solidarity and that Europe is willing to fulfil its NATO commitments in supporting the United States. By invoking Article 5 NATO made it clear to the outside world that the Alliance is faced with challenges of historical magnitude.

Even the most NATO-sceptic officials at the Pentagon acknowledge today that their failure to respond to the immediate post-September 11 offer from Europe to use the Alliance in the war in Afghanistan was a mistake. They now see the opportunity NATO presents in post-conflict conditions.

The Iraq crisis damaged NATO, too, since three nations refused to allow precautionary planning for the defense of a member nation (Turkey). “This really means”, as Klaus Naumann said, “to put the axe at the very roots of any defensive alliance since it destroys the credibility of NATO’s central promise, collective defense. If no corrective action were taken nations will inevitably look at coalitions of the willing. Increased reliance on such coalitions will turn out to be divisive at the end of the day”.

The War in Iraq was also the moment of truth for the Atlantic Alliance, whose future depends on a twofold strategy: it must be able to respond militarily to global security threats and it must be allowed politically to do so.

The following issues will be addressed in order for NATO to remain in business.

## **1. Military lessons of the Iraq war**

There is a lot to do since Saddam Hussein succeeded in damaging severely the UN, NATO and the EU and, as long as the existence of WMD remains to be proven, the credibility of the US.

The EU is possibly the organization which was most severely damaged. Europe does no longer speak with one voice. The majority of nations clearly signaled that they are not prepared to accept to be dominated by any other nation or nations. Europe must eventually understand that it will only have influence if it speaks with one voice and if that voice is backed by capabilities. This means that all efforts which do not include the UK are doomed to fail. This week's meeting of four European nations who wish to enforce more and closer defense cooperation will therefore fail as did the French attempt to enforce during the Iraq crisis a multipolar world.

The political repair work can succeed only if the European NATO allies were able to demonstrate that they understood the main military lesson: They need to acquire some 21<sup>st</sup> century capabilities.

The war in Iraq saw the quick defeat of a 20<sup>th</sup> century army by an armed force of the 21<sup>st</sup> century which was able to conquer a country of the size of France with some three army divisions, to some degree an indeed asymmetric war.

One can follow General ret. Klaus Naumann, former Chairman of the Military Committee of NATO, when he describes the lessons learnt from the war in Iraq :

Which were the ingredients of success ?

1. The US achieved operational surprise in an announced war since they began the war by joint and combined operations and not, as many had assumed, by an air campaign. This was complemented by tactical surprises achieved through operations by Special Forces. Some of them had been in Iraq for quite some time.
2. The US paralyzed the Iraqi C3 and air defense through surgical strikes within a couple of days which led to unchallenged air superiority.

3. The US applied for the first time ever Network Centric Warfare (NCW) by taking advantage of their incredible ISR capabilities which were linked to excellent C4 and connected to shooters of all kind. They thus reduced the response time to strike strategic targets to less than one hour.
4. The US forces availed themselves of a firepower which was superior to any they had fielded in previous Post-Cold-War conflicts in terms of precision, effectiveness, flexibility and mobility to support ground forces which were more mobile, flexible and agile than any force employed since WW II.
5. The US commanders operated in a daring and flexible way which took many observers truly by surprise.

The truly new dimension was the degree to which the US forces were able to conduct network centric operations against an enemy who initially offered a stiffer resistance than expected.

Network Centric Warfare (NCW) had seen its real and first time baptism of fire and had proven that it will allow numerically inferior 21<sup>st</sup> century forces to defeat numerically superior 20<sup>th</sup> century forces. As a consequence the American efforts to transform their armed forces will accelerate and in addition, as a consequence of the failure to win Turkey's support, the US will make additional efforts to gain full independence from access and overflight rights within the next ten years or so.

What does this mean for future conflicts and for force planning ?

For sure, all European nations but possibly Sweden are well advised to review their force planning very carefully since most of them still plan for 20<sup>th</sup> century forces. Industry should also look very carefully into the lessons learnt since they might wish to widen the range of products they offer and to either reduce emphasis on some of the products which are clearly left-overs from the Cold War or to modify them.

The key to modernization and transformation is C4ISR. The main emphasis should be on systems which provide the forces with actionable target information and this will for quite some time require the man in the loop, i.e. manned carriers big enough to accommodate the C4 which enables to link the three levels of

operations: ISR, C4 and precision engagement. UAVs and increasingly UCAVs will play an important supplementary role provided they have access to GPS or possibly one day Galileo information.

C4ISR is followed by all weather precision strike as the next key element of transformation.

European defense industry has much to offer in this area, so much that it could well create incentives for American companies to cooperate and to transfer some of their technology in other areas in exchange. To concentrate research on nano – and bio-technology and on supersonic cruise missiles seems to be one option European industry might wish to consider. The capabilities are there and that is one of the reasons why we Europeans should be optimistic about the future of the European Industry. Most of the precision strike weapons will be air- or sea-launched long range weapons but one should not forget the dimension of helicopter launched weapons as well since they could play an important role in support of Special Forces who will undoubtedly play a key role in any NCW operation. Special Forces are one of the best instruments to paralyse an opponent's C4 and that is after all the tactical aim of all NCW. High Energy weapons to switch of communications which the US obviously did not use this time might be another area of interest for both European Defense Industries and their clients in the European Defense Ministries.

Last but not least European Industry is well positioned to provide the armed forces with air mobility which remains a badly needed capability. All assets should in principle be equipped for air to air refueling, should be as stealthy as possible and should be designed for multiple purpose use, i.e.it should be possible to use them as transport assets and to equip them as gunships if required.

Obviously, these 21<sup>st</sup> century forces will need protection as well and one of the areas for which European defense industries can provide solutions is missile defense both for expeditionary forces as well as for the homelands. All solutions

to be found in this area will require transatlantic cooperation since the critical element is not so much the weaponry but the battle management system.

These observations are not much more than a very preliminary analysis, they cannot be more since Donald Rumsfeld is not expecting the American preliminary evaluation of the lessons learnt before 10 May 2003. They may have given the assumption of some of the basic and obvious trends that European defense industry is well positioned to provide the armed forces of the EU nations with some if not most of the equipment they will need for their transformation into 21<sup>st</sup> century forces. European industry might well have some fair chances on the American market as well through cooperative and joint ventures. The weak element in this forecast are the European customers, the MoDs, since none of them is very likely to get real big increases in their defense budgets.

## **2. Completion of Pragues' capabilities Agenda**

Prague became the Summit for transformation of NATO into a global Alliance. Global challenges require global security and thus a global NATO.

NATO has to go global or will become irrelevant. And ESDP has to become an equal pillar in the transatlantic security alliance. This means first and foremost to acquire capabilities that really matter in order to maintain interoperability between US and European NATO forces.

### **DCI**

In 1998 then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright realized this after it had become clear in Kosovo that the Alliance faces an increasing capability gap. As a reaction, she launched the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) which was adopted by the 1999 NATO Summit in Washington.

The objective of the 58 capability-items was and is to ensure that the Alliance can effectively carry out operations across the entire spectrum of its present and possible future missions – from responding to humanitarian disasters, to carrying out peace-enforcement operations, to conducting high-intensity warfare in defense of Alliance territory.

After it was clear that not even half of the NATO-members were really prepared to comply with the DCI-NATO improvement measures, the 2002 NATO-Summit in Prague launched the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) which reduced the 58 DCI items to four core areas:

1. Enhanced rapid deployment and sustainment, to ensure that NATO's forces are able to arrive quickly where and when they are needed, and to maintain operations over distance and time.
2. Improvement of interoperability between NATO forces, as key aspects of combat effectiveness. The growing technology gap between the United States and other member-states must be halted.
3. Enhancement of Command, Control and Information Systems to maintain information superiority. This will allow NATO to remain within the decision

cycle of any potential adversary and will optimize the application of military capabilities.

4. Improvement of NATO's ability to defend against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear attacks to reflect the heightened asymmetric threat posed by these weapons.

But that is all on paper: If Europe does not stop the pattern of announcing defense reform measures without sticking to its promises, the United States will have little choice but to act alone.

This would strengthen the already evident trend of US led "coalitions of the willing", and Europe's ability to influence US decisions and policy will further decline. This in turn will create even greater frustration and resentment in Europe, as Europe finds itself increasingly unable to affect decisions that impact on its own security.

#### Creation of NATO-Response-Force

Another key issue at the Prague Summit was the launching of a new NATO Response Force (NRF), which was initiated by the US to strengthen transatlantic capabilities.

The idea is that NATO needs a multilateral joint force for primarily out-of-area operations, with immediate readiness (5-30 days), thus capable to move quickly to wherever needed, as decided by the NATO Council. The NRF will bring together elite forces from both sides of the Atlantic and will be technologically advanced and highly flexible. It will have initial operating capability at the latest by October 2004, and full operating capability no later than October 2006. It will be capable of fighting in an NBC environment and self-sustainable for a certain period of time.

Tasks are similar to those of the European Reaction Force described in the Helsinki Headline goals, and include non-combatant evacuation operations, proactive force projection and serving as an initial entry force for a large scale operation.

The NRF, however, is essentially a strike force for use in high-intensity combat operations beyond Europe whereas the European Union's Reaction Force is primarily

designed for peace and stability operations in and around Europe. Thus, the forces are basically complementary rather than conflictual.

In essence it will be a NATO Force that allows European and US forces to fight together whenever and wherever the Alliance political authorities decide to and that will set a standard for all NATO Forces in the medium and long term. It would provide joint and combined High Readiness Force able to react very quickly to crises in or beyond Alliance territory for the full range of Alliance missions.

The NRF will set a new standard for European military capabilities. The need for strategic airlift, air refuelling, secure command and control and precision guided munitions for the European elements of the NRF would be clear and European governments would be challenged to set necessary priorities, to say the least.

The NRF has all chances to become a new US-European project with increased military cooperation and interoperability. The great advantage for Europe is that it requires interoperability with US-Forces (particularly with regard to the “Revolution in Military Affairs” - precision-guided munitions, stealth for greater power projection, advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems, and advanced command, control, communications and computing systems).

The German MOD emphasizes this integrative moment of the NRF by announcing that capabilities and troops for the European Reaction Force shall also be provided to the NRF and be under the command of either NATO or the EU, depending which organization takes the lead in a given operation.

### **3. Addition, not Duplication of EU Defense Capabilities to NATO-Set of Forces**

The EU and NATO need to work together as partners, not rivals on the EU' Security and Defense Policy. Independent European military planning capabilities are only duplicating already existing structures (SHAPE).

NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative, the EU Headline Goal and the EU's Collective Capability Goals should complement each other. And the 3D policy: no duplication, no de-coupling, no discrimination should also still apply for both sides.

To be clear: NATO and EU have only one set of Forces available to handle crises when needed. DCI and ESDP are meant to enhance the capabilities of this common NATO and EU set of forces, in order to make NATO's global role militarily credible.

A very wrong signal in this regard were those suggestions made in Brussels on 29 April 2003 by France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg regarding independent military planning of the EU and in particular regarding the creation of a NATO-independent EU headquarters. The realization of such plans would ultimately rival NATO and lead to a clash with the American Ally. Collin Powell made that clear when he commented what he called "some kind of plan" and emphasized what was needed was "more military capability, not more headquarters".

Europe in the 21<sup>st</sup> century deserves better propositions than these. It can only be taken seriously as a partner of the US if at least London, Berlin and Paris agree. In terms of military power, all efforts that do not include the UK are doomed to fail.

#### **4. Lead function for NATO in Afghanistan and Iraq**

In the Balkans NATO has proved itself effective. NATO handles post-conflict conditions very professionally. It provides practical support in securing and stabilizing a volatile environment and give a veneer of respectable multilateralism to the process.

Most of the 19 NATO Allies have had forces directly involved in operation "Enduring Freedom", the ongoing US-led military operation against terrorist targets in Afghanistan.

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been under the command of NATO members since its deployment in January 2002: United Kingdom, Turkey and, at the moment, Germany and the Netherlands. NATO Allies currently provide 95% of the more than 5000 personnel in ISAF III. NATO, as an organization, provides essential operational planning, intelligence and other support to ISAF III, and may assume an even greater role in the future.

NATO could and should play an equally important role in securing post-war Iraq since no instrument is as suitable as NATO with its range and its capacities to provide and guarantee peace, order and stability in post-war situations:

##### **1. Protection from Weapons of Mass Destruction**

NATO's deployable weapons labs can find NBC weapons, analyze their content, and secure the contaminated area. NATO can also provide soldiers with protective gear. NATO countries can provide response teams trained in the environmentally-friendly disposal of NBC weapons. This includes incineration, neutralization or destruction. The Czech chemical and biological brigade, with 400 troops, is said by NATO officials to be one of the best. The Poles, Germans, Hungarians, Britons and Americans also have teams well-trained in detection and removal of weapons of mass destruction. In addition, NATO countries have Explosive Ordnance Teams who are trained to get rid of and detect exploded and unexploded ordinances.

## 2. Communications

NATO countries can provide satellite communications, intelligence, and secure communications systems during a post-war reconstruction period. These would be coordinated from the military headquarters in SHAPE.

## 3. Command and Control System

Unlike the UN, NATO has a military headquarter and an organized command and control system that ensures that the communication, gear, infrastructure and equipment from the different countries are interoperable. This system makes it much easier to coordinate a NATO peacekeeping force in a post-war Iraq than a UN peacekeeping force. However, NATO's command and control structure could also make it possible for NATO to coordinate humanitarian help together with the United Nations. It could also make it possible for NATO to coordinate assistance for Iraq from non-NATO countries. Assistance from Arab countries such as Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Mauritania, Tunisia and Jordan could be further coordinated by NATO.

## 4. Civil Emergency Planning

NATO organizes national assets such as ships, airplanes, trains, medical facilities and communications in cases of war or other national disasters. It also coordinates the repair and rebuilding of streets, airports, bridges and water systems. These assets are brought together under the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee, which reports directly to the North Atlantic Council (SCEPC). SCEPC coordinates planning in the categories of European inland surface transport, ocean shipping, civil aviation, food and agriculture, industrial production and supply, post and telecommunications, medical matters, civil protection, and petroleum production and supply. After a meeting of all NATO nations' ambassadors and following their approval, NATO can immediately put into action any assistance that is needed in a civil emergency. For Civil Emergency Planning to be functional in Iraq, heavy lift transport would be needed as well as a large number of engineering battalions. The US is in the position to provide the airlift, and many European countries have the capability since the Prague Summit to make their engineering battalions available.

## 5. Policing

NATO countries provided training to local police and also provided policing throughout the crisis in the Balkans. NATO also has around 200 military police which could be used for the protection of the non-combatant population in Iraq.

NATO's capabilities can contribute to peace and stability in Iraq.

## **5. Strengthening NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue and gradual Widening to a Broader Middle East Dialogue**

The Mediterranean remains a fragmented and highly unstable region. Terrorism, religious extremism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction constitute a threat as much to the southern Mediterranean regimes as to the EU and NATO members. In the next decade all capitals of Southern Europe could be in range of missiles launched from North Africa and the Middle East.

The profound changes to the European security environment that resulted from the end of the Cold War led NATO to recognize the interdependence of European and Mediterranean security. NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue was launched 1994 and involves Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia and aims to achieve better mutual understanding between NATO members and the countries of the region.

The overall aim of NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue is to contribute to regional security and stability, and achieve better mutual understanding between NATO and its Mediterranean Partners. The Alliance also intends to correct any misperceptions that may have arisen with regard to NATO activities. In particular, it wants to dismantle the myth of an Alliance in search of new, artificial enemies. And it seeks to dissipate fears that the emerging European security architecture may exclude its Southern neighbours.

The tragic events of 9/11 have turned the Dialogue into key instrument for the relationship with the region. The strengthening and deepening of relations between NATO and the Mediterranean Dialogue countries is now considered among the highest priorities for the Alliance as confirmed at the Prague Summit. So far the Dialogue initiative has accomplished significant achievements:

- It became an important vehicle for information-sharing across the Mediterranean and developed into a useful confidence-building forum, especially after the creation of the Mediterranean Contact Group.
- It has provided a context for practical cooperation, and greatly increased the interest for the understanding of Mediterranean security within the Alliance.

- The Dialogue also created "contact" structures both inside NATO and in the Dialogue countries that allow for the accumulation of knowledge, information and experience and also on-job training for officials on non-traditional issues in a multinational environment.

However, the following measures would be recommendable in order to strengthen the Dialogue. In the region, NATO should:

1. Increase number of educational courses
2. Focus on civil emergency planning
3. Increase participation of the Dialogue countries in activities related to disaster management
4. Further enhance "low cost" confidence-building and transparency measures: for example, the notification of future military activities, discussion of a code of conduct for military activities and exchange of information among military staff
5. Invite Dialogue countries to send observers to large-scale NATO exercises
6. Sponsor fellowships and exchanges for researchers from Dialogue countries at major institutes in NATO countries dealing with defense and security matters
7. Increase support for visits to NATO by key opinion-makers from the Dialogue countries, especially journalists, academics and parliamentarians
8. Encourage greater participation in courses, especially peacekeeping courses as offered by the NATO School in Oberammergau
9. Reinforce the nongovernmental dimension and consider establishment of a NATO Mediterranean defense studies network
10. Consider establishing a crisis prevention and confidence-building network for the Mediterranean

Looking beyond the Mediterranean Dialogue, NATO needs to develop a long-term strategy for the broader region: The Dialogue could eventually evolve into a "Mediterranean Partnership for Peace" program, drawing inspiration from the "PfP" programs in Central and Eastern Europe and being applied to the countries of the Greater Middle East in order to foster their transformation and democratization.

NATO should also look to broaden the Dialogue to the Wider Middle East and build on the experiences of the Mediterranean Dialogue. Particularly, NATO should involve

young intellectuals, officers, parliamentarians, government and NGO-officials as well as journalists to influence future decision-makers.

## **6. Prepare NATO for Global Missions**

Does the Alliance want to play a real military role in the war against terrorism and the proliferation of WMD or will it become an “armed-OSCE”, irrelevant in projecting power on a global scale?

The Europeans will have to give an answer, not only to the ongoing demands of NATO-Secretary General George Robertson, but frankly to themselves: Are they interested and willing to keep NATO militarily relevant which means not only to make another general political commitment to increase expenditures, but a genuine, precise, timed commitment to acquire the missing defense capabilities, in order not to get increasingly marginalized? And the Americans will have to give an answer as well, not only to George Robertson, but frankly also to themselves: Are they interested to keep NATO militarily relevant for future crises at all, or is the doctrine viewed by the Pentagon, “keep the illusion alive” already the new policy of the Bush-Administration?

For sure, on 11 September 2001 the world did not really change. 9/11 just reminded us in a brutal way that the new strategic challenges are global in nature and need a collective response. Almost overnight the 11<sup>th</sup> of September persuaded the European allies to accept the key-lesson of a new NATO, a lesson that had already been discussed right after the end of the Cold War: that either NATO goes out of area or out of business. NATO’s prompt reaction on 12 September 2001 by invoking Art. 5, the Alliance made clear that it became de facto a global Alliance, since with the pledge to support the United States came no geographical limits.

The problem seems to be that some Europeans still see NATO as a collective defense and crisis management organization whereas the most powerful and indeed indispensable member country, the US, do no longer look at NATO as an instrument they would wish to use in conflict and war. They obviously regard NATO as an useful political instrument and a collective security arrangement which has the political task to stabilize Europe and to achieve the vision which lead to the foundation of NATO in 1949, a Europe whole and free. They wish to keep it.

A NATO, however, which thus became so political that its defense guarantee would

look hollow and which would no longer be used in crises, would soon lose support. In fact, that would be the end of NATO. This would be a disaster for Europe and it would be a severe blow to American national interests as well. The US would run the risk to lose the control of one of its opposing coast lines and it would give away one of its most powerful instruments of political influence on Europe as such. It is quite obvious that this must never happen since it is neither in the interest of the US nor of the Europeans.

So both, the US and its allies must find ways to revitalize NATO. That means definitely much more than further enlargement and a new agreement with Russia, it means also more than adaptation or the acquisition of a few more and more modern capabilities. NATO must no longer remain the regional defense Alliance it used to be. NATO must become a global Alliance, ready to defend its member countries' interests wherever they are at risk. Global challenges require global security – and global security requires a global NATO.

Following guidelines should be under consideration:

**First:** There is only one way to gain influence on the US and that is to possess capabilities which really matter. This means that the Europeans have to take an American approach: They should concentrate on those capabilities which the US need to run and sustain one or more operations such as Afghanistan and which at the same time will improve the ability of the EU to conduct operations on its own there, where the Americans do not wish to be involved. To this end NATO should really take a new approach to force planning: The issue is no longer to plan for capabilities which more or less copy American capabilities albeit at a much smaller scale, the issue is to identify American shortfalls and weaknesses and to plan for capabilities which reduce these weaknesses through the provision of non US-NATO-Forces. Examples for deficiencies for which the US would need European contributions in order to sustain operations or to be able to operate in more than one theatre are for example ground surveillance, air-to-air-refuelling and air transport, but also effective engagement assets. Such instruments in the hands of the US allies will obviously not come for free, but the funds needed for that are within the realm of the possible. Thus the allies would become indispensable for the Americans and hence

their influence would grow. Such an approach would kill two birds with one stone: It would foster the irreplaceable transatlantic link and it would at the same time strengthen the capabilities of the EU since, after all, we still talk about one set of forces. In addition, such steps could narrow the gap which exists today and which is growing minute by minute. The best evidence for this assertion is that the US defense budget foresees 140 billion US-\$ for capital investment, i.e. 37%, whereas most Europeans spend some 20% or so to modernize their forces. If the European allies act in that way, the Americans would simultaneously look at the other, truly substantial European political contributions from a different angle. They would no longer be seen as a compensation for the inability to contribute militarily but as a genuine contribution of its own value. Thus the Europeans could gain more political influence as well. It goes without saying that the willingness on the side of the Europeans to launch such a modernization program should be met by an increased American preparedness to share technology.

**Second:** This includes closer cooperation in infrastructure, defense, and logistics, the creation of transatlantic synergies in procurement policies, and closer cooperation of the defense industries across the Atlantic. Our policy should not be “buy American” or “buy European”. Rather, we must create conditions to “buy transatlantic”, i.e., procuring the most advanced systems at the lowest costs. Neither the Americans nor the Europeans can be interested to prolong the two-class-society as it has evolved in the wake of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). A serious political will in Washington to share US-technology with European allies is the precondition for transatlantic defense-consolidation which is indispensable to ensure NATO-interoperability and thus guarantee the future military cohesion of the Alliance.

**Third:** The military action-plan adopted at the Prague Summit – the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) and the Creation of a NATO-Response-Force (NRF) – should be the first step of a European Defense Improvement Program which could kill two birds with one stone: It would allow NATO to acquire the needed new capabilities and it would enable the EU to really implement the Helsinki Headline Goal. To this end the allies need to understand as well that they have to enter binding commitments this time otherwise they cannot expect the US to agree on the transfer of technology which is so badly needed. To this end NATO and the EU could

and should establish a monitoring and sanctions regime. The successful establishment of the European Monetary Union only worked because of strict criteria which had to be fulfilled and an iron fiscal discipline. There should be no doubt that NATO and EU-countries could apply similar strict criteria to their security policy in order to enhance their defense capabilities within NATO and the EU if the political will is there.

**Fourth:** However, all these good intentions will be in vain if Washington – instead of capitalizing on the momentum of a serious European commitment in the war against terror and in being prepared to do more in terms of military burden-sharing – continues its “NATO-a-la-card”-policy by grounding future military campaigns on a coalition of the able and willing including some NATO allies, but otherwise going it alone. Today as a result, we are witnesses of a beauty-contest in Europe over close -and sometimes exclusive- bilateral security ties with Washington. This might endanger not only European unity, but also the relevance of NATO as the core of transatlantic security. For sure the American preference for coalition-building within NATO is not least a response to the present lack of European defense capabilities, logistically understandable, but symbolically unfortunate. Even with the next US-defense budget envisioned at 415 billion US-\$ America will not be able to handle new crises and security challenges alone. It will still need a strong and reliable partner such as NATO, and Europe should still be the first and relevant choice. No one in Washington should forget that it are not only capabilities which matter in the war against terrorism, but also shared convictions and values. No one else in the world can offer this combination to the US but Europe.

**Fifth:** “To make the world safe for democracy in the 21<sup>st</sup> century” Washington will need the European allies. Meeting the new challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, also Europe will need a new credible and courageous policy, if it wants to become a mature partner of the United States and a global player. To be sure: Paris belongs into NATO, London into EMU, and Berlin is urged to do its homework, setting its strategic priorities, defining its foreign policy goals, and drawing the respective security-and military-related consequences. The Iraq crisis and 9/11 made clear that the political will to exercise a global player-role is imperative and the prerequisite for a competitive Europe in political, economic and military terms, and for a Europe that

cares to preserve together with its American friends its cultural identity vis a vis any attacks from totalitarian Islamic terrorists on Western Civilization. It is also the prerequisite for an equal partnership with the United States and a strong and balanced European-Atlantic Alliance, able to meet new challenges anytime – anywhere.

### III. Conclusion: Initiation of an EU-US Strategic Dialogue:

#### *The Papandreou / Powell – Report for a New Transatlantic Charta*

Aim of this paper was to contribute with some ideas about reshaping the European-American relations.

The issues raised in our paper could only be touched briefly here and a more devoted and concrete effort is advisable. Our recommendation would be to initiate a “New Transatlantic Charta” to revitalize the European-American Partnership. Such an effort should take place under the leadership of a senior European and a senior American politician in order to give it the adequate weight and depth.

Ideally, such a “New Transatlantic Charta” would not only be an agenda listing the deficits and assets of the EU-US relationship but would include a comprehensive strategy how to overcome the transatlantic rift. Applicable measures would be particular helpful, addressing all levels of transatlantic exchange - political, economic, military, academic and cultural.

The initiation of such a “New Transatlantic Charta” would require the leadership of highly regarded politicians on both sides of the Ocean. Given its very successful EU presidency – crowned by the signing of the Accession Treaties in Athens – Greece is very well positioned to lead the endeavor for crafting this Charta and H.E. Foreign Minister George Papandreou is one of its most distinguished and liked personalities in Europe as well as in the United States. Given his unbiased position within Europe and the transatlantic community, he would be an ideal candidate to co-chair a committee consisting of leading policy-makers and scholars from both sides of the Atlantic that shall gather regularly in order to craft a New Transatlantic Charta within the next six to eight months.

As his American counterpart we suggest H.E. US-Secretary of State, Colin Powell, as he is a strong defender of the interests of the transatlantic community and would give the initiative gravitas as well as public attention in the United States.

The **Papandreou-Powell-Report** for a “New Transatlantic Charta” could become the founding document for a renewed Partnership between Europe and the United States when both sides will reflect and remember their common roots, values and interests,

which have been covered recently under political differences. To overcome these differences is imperative for both, Europe and America.

The Potsdam Center for Transatlantic Security and Military Affairs would be honored if the dialogue on a “New Transatlantic Charta” would be held in our Institute.